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Favouring Small and Medium Sized Enterprises
with Directive 2014/24/EU?
Martin Trybus and Marta Andrecka*
This article argues that the four main measures introduced in the 2014 reform of the Pro-
curement Directives to promote Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) cannot be
classified as measures favouring SMEs. A measure favours SMEs when it compromises the
main objectives of competition, non-discrimination and value for money. The discussion
covers the regimes on the division of larger contracts into lots, the European Single Procure-
ment Document (ESPD), minimum turnover requirements, and direct payments to subcon-
tractors.
I. Introduction
Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SME) are the
dominant life form in the economies of all EUMem-
ber States. 20.8 million SMEs were registered in the
then 27 EU Member States in 2011. They amounted
to99.8%of all enterprises and contributedmore than
half of the Union’s GDP.1 Their share of public con-
tracts, however, is often deemed insufficient. In con-
trast to old Directive 2004/18/EC, Public Sector Direc-
tive 2014/24/EU2 includes measures designed – not
to directly increase the proportion of SMEs being
awarded public contracts – but to improve their ten-
dering conditions and thereby facilitate and encour-
age and thus increase their participation in public
procurement procedures. Thus, the Directive con-
tains four main ‘innovations’ directed at increasing
SME participation in public procurement: the divi-
sion of contracts into lots (III.), the European Single
Procurement Document (IV.), the limitation of re-
quirements for participation (V.), and direct pay-
ments to subcontractors (VI.).3Directive 2014/24/EU
also introduced a number of additional measures for
SMEs in less obvious places.4
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1 G Wessel Thomassen et al., SME’s access to public procurement
markets and aggregation of demand in the EU, PwC, ICF-GHK
and ECORYS, Study commissioned by the European Commission,
Directorate General for Internal Market and Services, Brussels,
February 2014, 5.
2 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repeal-
ing Directive 2004/18/EC [2014] OJ L94/65. For overviews of this
Directive, see F Lichère, R Caranta and S Treumer (eds), Mod-
ernising Public Procurement: The New Directive (Djøf: Copen-
hagen, 2014); Directive 2014/24/EU is part of the 2014 procure-
ment reform package which also includes two further Directives:
Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operat-
ing in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and
repealing Directive 2004/17/EC [2014] OJ L94/243 and Directive
2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
26 February 2014 on the award of concession contracts [2014]
OJ L94/1; For an overview of the reform, see R Caranta, ‘The
changes to the public contract directives and the story they tell
about how EU law works’ (2015) 52 CML Rev, 391–459; Issues 3
and 4 of the (2014) 23 PPL Rev; and G Skovgaard Ølykke and A
Sánchez Graells (eds), Reformation or Deformation of the EU
Public Procurement Rules in 2014 (Edward Elgar: Cheltenham
2016).
3 The promotion of SMEs has also been high on the agenda in the
UK where, more than a year before the April 2016 deadline, the
UK Public Contracts Regulations 2015 transposed most of the EU
measures, and, following the proposals of Lord Young (Growing
Your Business: A Report on Growing Micro Businesses, The
Second Part of the Report on Small Firms, May 2013, 19-23)
additionally abolished Pre-Qualification Questionnaires for
contracts below the thresholds, and established the single con-
tract portal ‘contracts-finder’, available at <https://www.gov.uk/
contracts-finder> (last accessed on 20 July 2017) to promote SME
participation and success in public procurement.
4 These refer to large scale dynamic purchasing systems (Recital
66), time limits (Recital 80), design contests (Recital 120) and
thresholds (Recital 134). Moreover, SME are mentioned for exam-
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Filling a gap in the literature regarding the use of
public procurement regulation to promote SMEs in
general and the innovations of Directive 2014/24/EU
in this matter in particular, this article will provide a
short legal analysis of these four ‘European’ SME
regimes to address the basic question whether they
can be considered as measures favouring SMEs
through public procurement. The question is not
whether these regimes amount to a legal framework
that makes SME promotion a sustainable goal, as the
introduction of four new techniques expressly in-
tended to promote SMEs clearly makes SME partic-
ipation an objective of Directive 2014/24/EU, an in-
tention clearly declared in Recital 124. The analysis
will be based on the understanding that a measure
for the promotion of SMEs in public procurement
constitutes a regime favouring5 SMEs when the pro-
curement rules are adjusted for that purpose to an
extent that compromises the primary objectives of
competition and value for money, of the contracting
authority procuring what it needs to operate at the
best possible terms.6With regards to the EUProcure-
ment Directives, a provision favouring SMEs would
also compromise their specific primary objectives of
non-discrimination (on grounds of nationality) and
equal treatment.7Aprovisionclearly favouringSMEs
to an extent that the primary objectives are compro-
misedwould be, for example, provisions comparable
to those of the US Small Businesses Act requiring a
minimumnumber of SMEs to be selected in compet-
itive procedures,8 or procurement procedures limit-
ed to SMEs comparable to the reserved contracts for
sheltered workshops now regulated in Article 20 of
Directive 2014/24/EU.9 Another example would be a
margin of preference for SMEs at the contract award
stage comparable to the “targeted procurement” in
favour of previously disadvantaged businesses in
post-Apartheid South Africa.10 Competition would
be limited by either excluding or disadvantaging
large companies in favour of SMEs. In contrast, what
Burgi calls “SME-fair”11 or “SME-friendly”12 mea-
sures and what Lichère calls measures “facilitating
SME access”13 aim to increase competition by level-
ling the playing field by addressing the specific prob-
lems that often prevent or compromise their partic-
ipation. This differentiation is important because the
introduction of SME favouring measures would rep-
resent a considerable change – away from the prima-
ry objectives,whereasmerely facilitating SMEaccess
does not compromise the primary objectives. Based
on this understanding, it will be argued that, with
the exception of a few details, the four SME-friendly
ple in Recital 59 where the Commission calls for the monitoring
of the aggregation of demand as a practice that has the potential
to disadvantage SMEs. According to Susie Smith, who discussed
this matter with the author in late September 2016, large scale
dynamic purchasing systems appear to prove a particularly
effective regime to increase SME participation in the UK. Promot-
ing SMEs through public procurement is a long-standing policy of
the EU, see inter alia: SMEs Participation in Public Procurement in
the European Community SEC(1992) 722; European Commission
Action Programme for SMEs COM(1986) 445 final; Public Pro-
curement: Regional and Social Aspects COM(1989) 400 final;
Promoting SME Participation in the Community COM(1990) 166
final.
5 F Lichère, ‘L’accès PME dans la Directive 2014/24’ in Y Marique
and K Wauters (eds), EU Directive 2014/24 on Public Procure-
ment: A New Turn for Competition in Public Markets? (Larcier:
Brussels 2016), 110, uses the equivalent French term “favoriser”
and considers the division into lots and the reserved contracts for
disabled workshops as examples but does not consider the former
a measure promoting secondary objectives.
6 See the differentiation between “SME-fair” and “SME-favouring”
in M Burgi, ‘Small and medium-sized enterprises and procure-
ment law’ (2007) 15 PPL Rev, 287-288.
7 Thanks to Luke Butler for discussing this with Martin Trybus based
on an earlier version of this article.
8 See also the judgment of the French Conseil d’Etat of 9 July 2007,
n° 297711, ruling against a provision of the 2006 Code de
Marchés Publics (Public Procurement Act) allowing contracting
authorities to select a minimum number of SMEs at the bid stage
as violating the principles of non-discrimination and equal treat-
ment. Thanks to François Lichère for pointing this out to Martin
Trybus when commenting on an earlier draft of this article; S
Saussier, ‘L’accès PME aux marches publics: une analyse
économique’ (2009), available at <http://www.webssa.net/files/
MARCHEPUB-VFINALE.pdf> (last accessed on 18 July 2017), 1,
reports that a quota for SMEs was even considered in France
(President Sarkozy in his lettre de mission to Finance Minister
Lagarde). In a contribution for the brochure for the Public Pro-
curement Week 2017 in London, Chris Hoyle, Deputy Director of
the Complex Transactions Team at the Cabinet Office, writes of
the possibility for the post-Brexit UK to “positively discriminate in
their [SMEs] favour” (p. 13).
9 Article 38 Utilities Procurement Directive 2014/25/EU is an
equivalent provision.
10 Ministry of Finance & Ministry of Public Works, Green Paper on
Public Sector Procurement Reform in South Africa (Pretoria, April
1997) and the Small Enterprises Development Agency SEDA.
11 Burgi (n 6), 297-288.
12 M Burgi, ‘Mittelstandsfreundliche Vergabe - Möglichkeiten und
Grenzen (Teil I)‘ (2006) 17 Neue Zeitschrift für Bau- und Ver-
gaberecht, 606-610: The German term „mittelstandsfreundliche
Vergabe” is to be translated as ‘SME-friendly’. However, in the
introduction on page 606 Burgi uses the term mittelstands-
gerechte Auftragsvergabe which is to be translated as ‘SME-fair’.
The latter term is preferable because it merely suggests levelling
the playing field whereas the earlier term suggests a certain
degree of preference, which is precisely not what it aims to
describe.
13 Lichère (n 5), 110.
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regimes of Directive 2014/24/EU are not measures
favouring SMEs.
II. Background
There isnouniversally accepteddefinitionof anSME
and the precise understanding of the concept also
varies in the Member States.14 However, for its pur-
poses Article 83(3) of Directive 2014/24/EU adopted
Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC, which
defines SMEs as enterprises with up to 250 employ-
ees and an annual turnover of up to €50 million
and/or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding
€43 million.15 A further differentiation is provided
with definitions of micro-,16 small-,17 and medium-
size enterprises.18 This definition is used for the pur-
poses of this article.19
A problem caused by any measures promoting
SME participation, in addition to the danger of na-
tional or even regional protectionism,20 is that such
measures will make the applicable procurement law
more complicated and therefore less user-friendly
and prone to violations and litigation. This can be a
deterrence for SME participation in itself.21 More-
over, these measures can lead to additional costs. Re-
lated to these problems, the promotion of SMEs is
often classified as a secondary,22 sustainable,23 hori-
zontal,24 or strategic objective or goal,25 as a ‘commu-
nity benefit’,26 akin to social or environmental27 con-
siderations in public procurement. While there is
strong support for the use of public procurement to
promote ‘secondary’ considerations,28 these are ob-
jectives in addition to and possibly compromising
the primary objective of public procurement, which
is to provide the public authority with the supplies
and services it needs to operate, connected to value
formoney andnon-discriminationobjectives and the
‘vehicles’ of competition and transparency to achieve
them.29A conflict arises inter aliawhen the econom-
ically most advantageous tender is not awarded the
contract or the costs of the procedure are higher be-
cause of the ‘horizontal’ objective. The promotion of
SMEscouldbe seenasa ‘secondary’ objectivebecause
14 See for example, on the German definitions, M Werner, ‘“Los”
oder “Nicht-Los” – das ist hier die Frage! Zur Mittelstandsklausel
des § 97 Abs. 3 GWB’ in HJ Prieß, N Lau and R Katzenberg (eds),
Wettbewerb – Transparenz – Gleichbehandlung: 15 Jahre Ver-
gaberecht, Festschrift for Fridhelm Marx (C. H. Beck: Munich
2013), 806-807: Werner cites especially the Federal Court of
Appeal (Bundesgerichtshof) in BGH NJW, 1992, 1039 in which
the Court ruled that there are “ultimately no useful criteria” for
the definition of an SME, especially rejecting the criteria of the
number of employees.
15 Article 2(1) of Title I of the Annex to Commission Recommenda-
tion 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of
micro, small and medium-sized enterprises [2003] OJ L124/36.
16 Ibid., Article 2(3): “an enterprise which employs fewer than 10
persons and whose annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet
total does not exceed EUR 2 million.”
17 Article 2(2) Recommendation 2003/361/EC: “an enterprise which
employs fewer than 50 persons and whose annual turnover
and/or annual balance sheet total does not exceed EUR 10 mil-
lion”.
18 The limit of Article 2(1) Recommendation 2003/361/EC; These
definitions are also used in the UK, see the Lord Young report,
Make Business Your Business: Supporting the Start-up and Devel-
opment of Small Business (First Part of the Report on Small Firms),
May 2012, 2.
19 Werner (n 14), 806, criticises the SME definition of the Recom-
mendation as adding little for procurement law as originating in
EU State aid law. A further discussion of the various definitions,
however, would go beyond the aims of this article.
20 E Ruh, ‘Mittelstandsbeteiligung an öffentlichen Aufträgen’ (2005)
5 Vergaberecht, 735, reports that 80% of the turnover of the SMEs
who returned his questionnaire is made within 20km from the
seat of the company. Promoting SME thus often means promoting
domestic SMEs and even SMEs from the same region as the
contracting authority.
21 Saussier (n 8), 9.
22 This term is used inter alia in by M Burgi, D Dragos et al. and G
Racca in their chapters in R Caranta and M Trybus (eds), The Law
of Green and Social Procurement (Djøf: Copenhagen 2010).
23 The chapters of R Caranta, S Treumer, L Vidal, M Spyra, J Gonza-
léz Garcia and M Trybus in R Caranta and M Trybus, ibid., use
this term.
24 This term was coined by S Arrowsmith and P Kunzlik in the
chapter ‘Public procurement and horizontal policies in EC law:
general principles’ in their edited collection Social and Environ-
mental Policies in EC Procurement Law (Cambridge: CUP 2009).
25 This term is used inter alia in W Kahlenborn et al., Strategic Use
of Public Procurement in Europe (Final Report to the European
Commission, MARKT/2010/02/C 2011).
26 This term was used in a session of the 2015 Procurement Week
organised by the University of Bangor and the Welsh Government
in Cardiff in March 2015.
27 See Caranta/Trybus (n 22).
28 See inter alia C McCrudden, Buying Social Justice. Equality,
Government Procurement and Legal Change (Oxford: OUP,
2007); Arrowsmith/Kunzlik (n 24); S Arrowsmith, ‘Horizontal
Policies in Public Procurement: A Taxonomy’ (2010) 10 Journal of
Public Procurement, 149; P Kunzlik, ‘Green Public
Procurement—European Law, Environmental Standards and
‘What to Buy’ Decisions’ (2013) 25 Journal of Environmental
Law, 173; A Semple, A Practical Guide to Public Procurement
(Oxford: OUP 2015); and the contributions in Caranta/Trybus (n
22).
29 On the objectives of public procurement regulation see the short
yet seminal article of S Schooner, ‘Desiderata: Objectives for a
System of Government Contract Law’ (2002) 11 PPL Rev, 99-102
or S Arrowsmith, J Linarelli and D Wallace Jr., Regulating Public
Procurement: National and International Perspectives (London:
Kluwer Law International 2000), chapter 1, 27-32.
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these enterprises create considerably more employ-
ment than large companies, the promotion of em-
ployment clearly being a secondary or strategic ob-
jective, and thus promoting SMEs means promoting
employment.30 Moreover, the promotion of SMEs is
often intended to promote local economies; smaller
companies are frequently local companies, and ‘lo-
cal’ almost inevitably means national.31 This implies
protectionism which cannot be reconciled with the
Internal Market.
Traditionally the Court of Justice established a
rather restrictive approach to the use of public pro-
curement to promote secondary objectives.32 Thus,
procurement rules promoting strategic objectives in-
cluding SMEparticipationmust be reconcilable with
the primary objectives, especially non-discrimina-
tion and competition.33 It is not least for this reason
that the old Public Sector Directive 2004/18/EC did
not contain many adjustments to promote SMEs34
and the Commission initially addressed SMEs with
soft law.35 However, the protectionist aspect of the
objective has to be put into perspective: not all SMEs
can be seen as only local and therefore national en-
terprises. The division into lots discussed below, for
example, may well lead to, for example, more Mora-
vian SMEs bidding for smaller contracts in Bavaria,
Lower Austria, or Upper Silesia.
The economic importance of SMEs has an impact
on the discussion of whether the promotion of SMEs
is seen as a secondary or horizontal or strategic ob-
jective of public procurement regulation at all. The
Germans, for example, traditionally more reserved
about these objectives, which they used to call ‘as-
pects alien to procurement’,36 see SME promotion as
a separate issue.37 More SME participation in public
contracts could increase competition throughawider
30 According to Financing SMEs and Entrepreneurs 2012: An OECD
Scoreboard (OECD Publishing: Paris 2012), 76, 91, 119 and 153
respectively, 60.5% of the workforce in France, 80% of the work-
force in Italy, and 72% of the workforce in Portugal are employed
by SMEs. SMEs generate the majority of new job creation; for a
recent assessment, see PW Wright et al., ‘Job Creation, Job De-
struction and the Role of Small Firms: Firm-Level Evidence for the
UK’ (2010) 72 Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics,
621-647; see also Recital 124 Directive 2014/24/EU pointing out
that “given the potential of SMEs for job creation, growth and
innovation it is important to encourage their participation in
public procurement […].”; see also S Schoenmaekers, ‘The role of
SMEs in promoting sustainable procurement’ in B Sjåfjell and A
Wiesbrock (eds), Sustainable Public Procurement under EU Law
(Cambridge: CUP 2016), 160–181.
31 That means with the exception, to an extent, of deeply integrated
border regions of two or more Member States, such as the Bel-
gian-Dutch-German region around Maastricht-Aachen. The
danger of SME-friendly polices to foster an anti-competitive or
anti-free movement effect is acknowledged by Lichère (n 5), 119.
32 See inter alia Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus Finland v. Helsinki
Kaupunki [2002] ECR I-7213; Case C-448/01 EVN Wienstrom AG
v. Austria [2003] ECR I-14521; Case C-31/87 Gebroeders Beent-
jes v. The Netherlands [1988] ECR I-4365; Case C-225/98 Com-
mission v. France (Nord Pas de Calais) [2000] ECR I-4475; see
also S Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement.
Regulation in the EU and the UK, Vol. 1 (3rd edition, London:
Sweet & Maxwell 2014), 8 and 1256-93; and PA Trepte, Regulat-
ing Procurement. Understanding the Ends and Means of Public
Procurement Regulation (Oxford: OUP 2004), 168-76. However,
there is some evidence to demonstrate CJEU’s shift towards the
allowance of pursuing broader sustainable objectives; see CJEU’s
more recent ruling in Case C-115/14 RegioPost GmbH & Co. KG
v Stadt Landau in der Pfalz, (RegioPost) [2015] ECLI-760, uphold-
ing the minimum wage clause; and Case C-368/10 Commission v
Netherlands (Dutch Coffee) [2012] ECLI-284, allowing to address
social considerations such as fair trade in award criteria.
33 A Sánchez Graells, in ‘Truly competitive public procurement as a
Europe 2020 lever: what role for the principle of competition in
moderating horizontal policies’, paper delivered at the UACES
Conference, 9 September 2015, in Bilbao, highlights that “[o]ther-
wise, it risks diminishing its own effectiveness and efficiency due
to the incompatibility of such extraneous considerations” and
cites SL Schooner, ‘Commercial Purchasing: The Chasm between
the United States Government’s Evolving Policy and Practice’ in S
Arrowsmith and M Trybus (eds), Public Procurement: The Contin-
uing Revolution (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2003),
159, and also reminds us that “[t]his has been warned for a long
time” citing C Turpin, Government Procurement and Contracts
(Essex: Longman 1989), 67. For extended discussion and further
references to this academic debate, see also A Sánchez Graells,
Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules (2nd edition,
Hart: Oxford 2015), 101-104.
34 Recital 32 Directive 2004/18/EC wants to “encourage the involve-
ment of small and medium-sized undertakings in the public
contracts procurement market,” but to that end only considers
that “it is advisable to include provisions on subcontracting.” The
emphasis on subcontracting is confirmed by the provisions on
subcontracting in Articles 25 and 60, the remainder of the instru-
ment not containing any SME relevant provisions, apart from the
aggregation rule in Article discussed below; Lichère (n 5), 110.
35 European Commission, European Code of Best Practices Facilitat-
ing Access by SMEs to Public Procurement Contracts, Staff Work-
ing Document SEC(2008) 2191.
36 Translated by Martin Trybus from the German original ver-
gabefremde Aspekte.
37 See M Burgi, ‘Secondary Considerations in Public Procurement in
Germany’, Caranta/Trybus (n 22), 105-142, at 136-138: The
promotion (Förderung) of SMEs features prominently in the pro-
curement laws of some of the German States (Länder), see inter
alia, § 6(1) Hessisches Vergabegesetz vom 5 März 2013 (GVBl.
6/2013 S. 121); §§ 1(1) and 4 Gesetz über die Vergabe öffentlich-
er Aufträge in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern(Vergabegesetz Meck-
lenburg-Vorpommern - VgG M-V)vom 7. Juli 2011 GVOBl. M-V
2011, S. 411; or § 3 Gesetz über die Vergabe öffentlicher Aufträge
in Sachsen-Anhalt (Landesvergabegesetz - LVG LSA) vom 19.
November 2012 GVBl. LSA 2012, 536. The traditional negative
attitude towards ‘secondary objectives’ appears to have changed.
At the 17th Forum Vergabe Gespräche in Fulda (Germany) in April
2015, the main German procurement conference, the relevant
presentations considered ‘nachhaltige Vergabe’ (sustainable
procurement) as the new consensus. See as examples for a strong
emphasis on secondary considerations: Berliner Ausschreibungs-
und Vergabegesetz (BerlAVG) vom 08.07.2010 (GVBl. S. 399
vom 22.07.2010), most recently amended by the Erste Gesetz zur
Änderung des Berliner Ausschreibungs- und Vergabegesetzes vom
05.06.2012 (GVBl. S. 159 vom 16.06.2012).
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and more innovative supplier and provider base and
thus have an effect on the objective of value formon-
ey.38 Economic theory supports this positive effect
on competition, and also emphasises that specialised
SMEs can be more efficient on certain contracts or
contract parts requiring their specialism, and that
their participation makes collusion between the big
companies more complicated.39
Moreover, since in contrast to large companies
SMEs exist in all and especially also the smallerMem-
ber States, the participation of these companies has
also an Internal Market dimension, furthering the
free movement of goods and services (including
works) in all Member States. In other words, it pro-
motes a European procurement market not just for
big business in big Member States. However, SMEs
create proportionately more employment than large
companies, trainmore people, provide economic sta-
bility even during an economic crisis, and are loyal
to the regions in which they are based.40 For all these
reasons, which as Burgi rightly points out are diffi-
cult or impossible to quantify,41 SMEs are close to the
heartofpoliticians inall theMemberStates, as shown
inter alia by the references to SMEs in Articles
158(2)(b), 173(1) and 179(2) TFEU.42 Nevertheless,
these reasons aremore in line with secondary or hor-
izontal objectives and explain why, as in this article,
the promotion of SME participation in public pro-
curement is often alsodiscussed as a sustainable goal.
III. Division into Lots
A public contract can be awarded as a single contract
to only one prime contractor or it can be divided into
several smaller parts or lots which are then awarded
separately andpossibly todifferent contractors.Apro-
curement can involve the award of a contract for a
complete airport, for example. Alternatively, that con-
tract can be divided into lots, say one for the construc-
tion of the terminal, another for the construction of
the runways, and yet another one for all electrical ap-
pliances, and so on. Public contracts can be divided
into lotsuntil any resulting lotbecomesundividable.43
Lots can be homogeneous44 and heterogeneous.45 Re-
garding the number of lots, there is some evidence in-
dicating that a division into many lots (more than 10)
considerably increases the participation and chances
of micro- and small companies of being awarded the
contract. In contrast, the division into only a few lots
(2-4) reduces participation from small, medium-sized,
and large enterprises and only increases participation
and chances of micro-companies.46 Additionally, the
size of the lots determineswhich companies have suf-
ficient capacity to bid for at least one lot.47 However,
awardinga single large contract lowers administrative
costs48 and increases buying power49 and economies
of scale.50 Moreover, division might undermine the
effectiveness of procurement when it is not technical-
ly or economically feasible or when the number of
38 Burgi (n 12), 607.
39 See V Grimm, R Pacini, G Spagnolo, and M Zanza, ‘Division
into lots and competition in procurement’, chapter 7, in N Dim-
itri, G Piga and G Spagnolo (eds), Handbook of Procurement
(Cambridge: CUP 2006), 179-180; Saussier (n 8), 2; Unless SMEs
become implicit in collusion. SMEs are just as prone to collusion
as big companies. In fact, they may be more so as a matter of
economic necessity. Thanks to Luke Butler for pointing this out
when commenting on an earlier version of this article.
40 Burgi (n 6), 285.
41 Burgi (n 12), 607, who also cites H Willems, Die Förderung des
Mittelstands: Wirtschaftsverfassungsrechtliche Legitimation und
Vergaberechtliche Realisierung (Carl Heymanns: Cologne 2003),
56, for a systematic documentation of the political motivations for
SME fairness.
42 These are Treaty articles which require the unanimous approval of
all Member States.
43 M Linthorst, J Telgen and F Schotanus, ‘Buying bundles: the
effects of bundling attributes on the value of bundling’ Proceed-
ings of the 2008 International Procurement Conference in Amster-
dam, define the term ‘undividable’ as undividable for buyer’s
markets, which they explain by example: “Consider buying a
bundle of electricity for two office buildings. According to the
definition this will be a bundle of two products; you can find a
supplier willing to deliver electricity for one of your office loca-
tions. Buying electricity for a part of an office building would be
much harder, because no markets exist for supplying electricity to
parts of office buildings. So the undividable product of the bundle
is one office building” (p. 4).
44 Each lot consists of the same product (for example cars or clean-
ing services).
45 Each lot consists of a different product, for example when the
contracts for a new airport is divided into different lots for the
construction of the building, doors, electrical appliances, win-
dows, toilets, etc.
46 J Stake, ‘SME Participation and Success in Public Procurement’
(Södertörn University 2014), 23.
47 See Grimm/Pacini/Spagnolo/Zanza (n 39), 168, 180.
48 A Loman, F Ruffini and L de Boer, ‘Designing ordering and
inventory management methodologies for purchased parts’ (2002)
38 Journal of Supply Chain Management, 22-29; On the addition-
al costs, see RP McAfee and J McMillan, Incentives in Govern-
ment Contracting (Toronto: TUP 1987), 57-60.
49 J Ramsay, ‘The resource based perspective, rents, and purchas-
ing’s contribution to sustainable competitive advantage’ (2001) 37
Journal of Supply Chain Management, 38-47; VA Mabert and T
Schönherr, ‘An online RFQ system: a case study’ (2001) 5 Practix,
1-6.
50 L Birou, SE Fawcett and GM Magnan, ‘Integrating product life
cycle and purchasing strategies’ (1997) 33 Journal of Purchasing
and Materials Management, 23-31.
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size of the lots is not geared towards the market in
which they are to generate competition. Reasons not
to divide into lots include that the different compo-
nents of a contract are highly dependent on each oth-
er or when there is a need to coordinate them.51
1. Article 46 of Directive 2014/24/EU
Different to theoldDirective2004/18/EC,Article46(1)
of Directive 2014/24/EUprovides that contracting au-
thorities may award contracts divided into separate
lots while they are free to determine the size and sub-
ject-matter of such lots.52 This is clearly intended as
a technique to promote SME participation in public
procurement.53 According to Article 46(4), Member
States may also require rather than just allow the di-
vision into separate lots in their national laws trans-
posing the Directive.54 However, in cases in which
this has not been made obligatory by the transpos-
ing national law55 or when not dividing into lots is
allowed in certain cases,56 contracting authorities
shall indicate the main reasons for their decision not
to divide into lots. This means that the division into
lots is the default approach suggested by the Direc-
tive andMember States have the option to make this
obligatory for all or parts of the contracts subject to
the Directive and their transposing national laws.
However, the new Directive does not require the
division into lots, although the decision not to divide
a contract into lots requires a communication of the
reasons: the “divide or explain principle”.57 This rais-
esmanyquestions inMemberStates (such as theUK)
that have opted for divide or explain in their trans-
posing laws. How difficult is it not to divide and ex-
plain? Does there have to be a good ‘excuse’ or is ‘ex-
plaining’ merely a formality that can be satisfied by
providing ‘cut and paste’ generic reasons? Can the
decision not to divide and explain be subject to judi-
cial review in the Member State or through an en-
forcement action against theMember State? Howev-
er, these largely open questions do not impact on the
research question of this article, since as argued be-
low, not even the compulsory division into lots qual-
ifies as a measure favouring SMEs.
2. Lot Bundling
According to Article 46(2), the transposing national
laws may provide that bids “may be submitted for
one, for several or for all of the lots” of a divided con-
tract (lot bundling). However, “even where tenders
may be submitted for several or all lots, [the contract-
ing authority may] limit the number of lots that may
be awarded to one tenderer”.58 Furthermore, accord-
ing to Article 46(3) the transposing legislation may
provide that “more than one lot may be awarded to
the same tenderer,” and that “contracting authorities
may award contracts combining several or all lots.”
The transparency requirements that comewith these
paragraphs essentially provide that the contract no-
tice must state howmany bids for howmany lots are
allowed. Thus Article 46(2)-(3) allows the use of sev-
eral approaches. Limiting lot bundling can amount to
ameasure favouring SMEs because larger companies
cannot benefit from their advantages (economies of
scale) leading to higher prices for individual lots.
However, such an approach is possible but not re-
quired by the Directive and might even be left to be
decided by contracting authorities. Whether an ap-
proach on lot bundling represents a regime favour-
ingSMEs thusdepends on transposition andpractice.
3. Alternative Bids
It is not clear whether Article 46 allows a bidder to
make different bids for each lot on the one hand and
a different and probably lower one if he or she is
51 Linthorst/Telgen/Schotanus (n 43), 10.
52 See also the very similar Article 65 of Utilities Directive
2014/25/EU.
53 Recital 78 of Directive 2014/24/EC reads: “Such division could be
done on a quantitative basis, making the size of the individual
contracts better correspond to the capacity of SMEs, or on a
qualitative basis, in accordance with the different trades and
specialisations involved, to adapt the content of the individual
contracts more closely to the specialised sectors of SMEs or in
accordance with different subsequent project phases”.
54 Also Article 65(4) Utilities Directive 2014/25/EU; see the old
Article 10 CMP 2006 (France) and old §97(3) GWB (Germany),
see below, after the transposition of Directive 2014/24/EC, Article
32 Ordonnance n° 2015-899 du 23 juillet 2015 (France) and
§97(4) GWB 2016 (Germany) respectively.
55 Regulation 46 [UK] Public Contracts Regulations 2015, Regula-
tion 46 [Irish] European Union (Award of Public Authority Con-
tracts) Regulations 2016 and §22 [Austrian] BVergG 2006, as
amended in 2016.
56 Article 32 II. Ordonnance n° 2015-899 du 23 juillet 2015.
57 S Smith, ‘Practical Issues of division into lots (divide and explain
principle)’ at the Public Procurement: Global Revolution VII
conference in Nottingham, 16 June 2015.
58 Emphasis added.
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awarded all or several lots on the other hand (alter-
native bids). In other words, it is not clear whether
Article 46(2) allows abidder to offer a rebate if award-
ed several or all lots.59 It could be argued that pro-
hibiting rebates goes beyond a SME-friendly level-
ling of the playing field. Rebates affect the question
of whether a procurement law favours SMEs to an
extent that negatively affects value for money. Not
allowing the described rebate would be an SME
favouring measure since in the end a (significantly)
higher price could be paid for the contract as a
whole.60 It is argued that this would go against the
objectives ofArticle 46 for the same reason. If rebates
canbe offered for all the lots then the SMEs forwhich
the contract has been divided will be priced out of
the competition, thereby undermining the objectives
of the division into lots. However, the Directive61 is
not clear on thisquestionanda judgmentof theCourt
of Justice might be required and it is possible the
Court would rule against rebates as they undermine
the SME-friendly purpose of Article 46. France, as
Lichère reports “surprisingly”,62 allowed the previ-
ously banned alternative bids in its 2016 transposing
legislation.63 Lichère also points out, that allowing al-
ternative bids with rebates is good for the public
purse but less so for SMEs.64 He argues that if the
French legislator really wanted to favour SMEs they
better revert to the prohibition of alternative bids, al-
though thiswould take economies of scale out of pub-
lic contracts.65 Thus, this old French approach to al-
ternative bids represented a measure favouring
SMEs. It is remarkable that the new Directive with
its SME-friendly objectives appears to have led to the
repeal of an SME favouring measure. However, this
also proves how low the level of harmonisation actu-
ally is: Member States are left with considerable leg-
islative discretion.
4. Favouring SMEs?
Overall, it is argued that for reasons related to divi-
sion into lots regimes in general and to Article 46 in
particular, the division into lots regime in Article 46
of Directive 2014/24/EU cannot be classified as a
regime favouring SMEs. In comparison to the award
of one large contract, dividing it into lots will often
cause extra costs, for example, through additional
staff time. However, competitive procurement pro-
cedures also have this effect in comparison to single
source procurement. Competition created by com-
petitive procurement procedureswill regularlymore
than compensate for the additional costs and effort
involved. The additional competition created by the
facilitation of SME participation66 will regularly
have a similar effect. The devil is in the detail, name-
ly in the rules on bundling and alternative bids. As
both appear to be allowed, the competition through
the participation of larger companies who can use
their advantages can be maintained. These details
are important to ensure that SMEs can participate in
addition rather than instead of large companies,
59 Thanks to François Lichère for bringing this issue to the attention
of Martin Trybus when commenting on an earlier draft of this
article.
60 However, Article 10 of the old French CMP 2006 expressly
prohibited such a rebate as favouring larger companies. Article 10
(1) sentence 3 Code des Marchés Publics 2006: “Les candidats ne
peuvent présenter des offres variables selon le nombre de lots
susceptibles d'être obtenus.” [English: “Bidders shall not submit
variant offers for the lots they are bidding for.” Translation of the
author]. This issue is not addressed in §97(3) of the old German
GWB.
61 Nor is the European Code of Best Practices, SEC(2008) 2193, 7-8
(Recital 78 Directive 2014/24/EU still recommends the use of this
document).
62 Lichère (n 5), 112.
63 Article 32 I. para 4 Ordonnance n° 2015-899 du 23 juillet 2015
reads: “Les offres sont appréciées lot par lot sauf lorsque
l'acheteur a autorisé les opérateurs économiques à présenter des
offres variables selon le nombre de lots susceptibles d'être
obtenus [emphasis added].” Neither §97(4) GWB 2016 nor §30
VgV clarify whether alternative bids are allowed in Germany and
Regulation 46 [UK] Public Contracts Regulations does not ad-
dress the question.
64 Lichère (n 5), 112.
65 Ibid.
66 L Carpineti, G Piga and M Zanza, ‘The Variety of Procurement
Practice: Evidence from Public Procurement’ in Dimitri/Pi-
ga/Spagnolo (n 39), 23-24; C Bovis, EC Public Procurement Law
(London: Longman 1997), 117; Burgi (n 6), 293-294;
Grimm/Pacini/Spagnolo/Zanza (n 39), 179; McAfee/McMillan (n
48), 57-60; Sánchez Graells (n 34), 348-349, citing recent empiri-
cal support for this effect: M Amaral, S Saussier and A Yvrande-
Billon, ‘Expected Number of Bidders and Winning Bids: Evidence
form the London Bus Tendering Model’ (2013) 47 Journal of
Transport and Economic Policy, 17-34, and also citing J de Brux
and C Desireux, ‘To allot or not to Allot Public Services? An
Incomplete Contract Approach’ (2014) 37 European Journal of
Law and Economics, 455-476, emphasising the positive effects of
competition for contracting authorities; Saussier (n 8), 12, points
out that in many sectors the response rate is so low and as a
consequence competition so limited that an increase in SME
participation can be expected to have tangible effects on compe-
tition and thus drives prices down.
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thereby ensuring an increase in competition. If an
increase in competition and thus lower prices and
other economic advantages canbe achieved, thenval-
ue for money is enhanced and not compromised, as
would be the case most importantly with reserved
contracts.
Moreover, the level of harmonisation is set too low
for Article 46 itself to qualify as a measure favouring
SMEs. Only the transposition of Article 46may have
this effect, possibly through an excessively rigid
regime of compulsory division and especially by lim-
itations of lot bundling and alternative bids. Such ap-
proaches to transposition are possible due to the low
intensity of harmonisation and lack of clarity in cer-
tain aspects. However, it would be national legisla-
tive decisions and not EU harmonisation which
would compromise competition and thus constitute
a measure favouring SMEs.
IV. The European Single Procurement
Document (ESPD)
One of the main challenges of SMEs participation in
public procurement are the significant costs and ad-
ministrative burden associated with the documenta-
tion required for the qualification stage of the pro-
curement process.67 These obstacles derive from the
obligation of economic operators to provide docu-
mentary evidence of their compliance with tender
terms and conditions at the very beginning of the
procurement procedure. The ESPD was introduced
inter alia to resolve these issues,68 as a part of a wider
European public procurement reform aimed at sim-
plification, red tape reduction, and streamlining the
documentation requirements.69 The ESPD is not
strictly intended as an instrument to promote SMEs
participation in public procurement – a reduction in
red tape would also relieve larger bidders. The ambi-
tion of the legislator was for the ESPD to simplify
cross-border procurement and help providing access
to new opportunities for businesses, including
SMEs.70 However, larger companies have the re-
sources to deal with red tape giving them an advan-
tage over SMEs which do not or less so. Therefore, a
reduction of red tape could facilitate the participa-
tion of SMEs by levelling the playing field without
disadvantaging large companies, except through the
increased competition. In order to ascertain whether
it is a measure favouring SMEs it is necessary to look
at some details of the ESDP regime.
1. Features of the ESDP
The ESPD is a standard self-declaration designed as
a ‘one size fits all’ blueprint which, in principle, an
economic operator completes once and can reuse in
any future tender. It replaces the obligation of pre-
senting originals of all pre-qualification documents
and represents a means of preliminary evidence for
the bidder meeting the tender requirements (exclu-
sion grounds [Article 57]; selection criteria [Article
58]; reliance on third party capacities [Article 63];
andcriteria for reducing thenumberofqualified can-
didates [Article 65]).71 The ESPD is divided into six
parts which shall include information regarding: 1)
procurement procedure and contracting authority;
2) economic operator; 3) exclusion criteria; 4) selec-
tion criteria; 5) reduction of the number of qualified
candidates; and 6) concluding statements.72 As all
six parts make cross-references to the procurement
documents, in practice the ESPDwill need to be com-
pleted for each procurement individually. Thus, the
ESDP is failing in its ambition to be a single stan-
dard for multiple procurements. This may be partic-
ularly the case when a procurement is to include as-
pects such as lots, subcontracting, or relying on third
party capabilities, or all of these, or a variation of
67 European Commission, Green Paper on Modernisation of EU
Public Procurement Policy: Towards More Efficient European
Procurement Market, Working paper, Synthesis of Replies at 6, 4
and 15; M Trybus, ‘The Promotion of Small and Medium-Sized
Enterprises in Public Procurement: A Strategic Objective of the
New Public Sector Directive’ in F Lichère, R Caranta and S
Treumer (eds), Modernising Public Procurement: The New Direc-
tive (Copenhagen: Djøf 2014), 266-267.
68 Article 59 of Directive 2014/24/EU.
69 Both electronic and paper versions of the ESPD may exist until 18
April 2018.
70 The limitation of ESPD is acknowledged in Recital 84 from which
it follows that ESDP is not to remove but to “limit […] major
obstacle to […] participation in public procurement”.
71 Already before the introduction of the ESPD in some Member
States, a variation of standardised selection stage document
existed, see self-declaration in France, Portugal, Spain, Germany,
Nordic countries or Pre-Qualification Questionnaire (PQQ) in the
United Kingdom. However, the issue has been that these national
standardised documents systems were not harmonised across the
EU, creating therefore obstacles for economic operators wishing
to compete for cross-border procurements.
72 European Commission Implementing Regulation 2016/7, January
2016 establishing the standard form for the European Single
Procurement Document, Annex I [2016] OJ L 3/16-34.
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them.73 When a public contract is to be divided in-
to lots, a specific ESPD is to be provided for each lot.
If the contract is to include subcontracting, a con-
tracting authority may require subcontractors to
complete appropriate parts of their own ESPDs.74 If
the bidder relies on third party capabilities, each
third party will need to complete its own separate
ESPD.
The completed ESPD is to be submitted with the
tender in openprocedures, orwith the request to par-
ticipate in other procurement procedures.75Only the
successful bidder is then to submit ‘without delay’76
the updated, full supporting documentation, on the
request of the contractingauthority, before theaward
of the contract.77 The successful bidder is not re-
quired to provide the full documentation if that can
be acquired “directly by accessing a national data-
base in any Member State that is available free of
charge, such as the national procurement register, a
virtual company dossier, an electronic document
storage system, or a prequalification system”, or
when the contracting authority already possesses
these documents. The ESPD service is integrated
withE-Certis, a freeonlinemapping toolused to iden-
tify and compare certificates requested in public pro-
curement procedures across the EU. It is not obliga-
tory for contracting authorities to request an ESPD,
but there is a clear obligation to accept a submitted
ESPD as a preliminary and sufficient evidence of its
compliance with the procurement terms and condi-
tions.78
2. A Shift of Costs and Burden Away
from Economic Operators?
It is argued that the ESPD leads to additional costs,
administrative burden, and increase in complexity
in procurement procedures for the contracting au-
thorities. Thus, it is questionable whether simplifica-
tion and cost savings can be achieved on both sides
of the procurement relationship. Rather, a transfer
of the related costs and obligations from the econom-
ic operator to the contracting authority takes place.
Contracting authorities now have to locate the rele-
vant information among the copies of documents
they already possess or in freely available databas-
es.79 Telles welcomes this shift as an incentive for
contracting authorities to request only the necessary
documents, as they will bear the costs and have to
make the effort, rather than the economic operators,
as before 2014.80 However, this shift of burden cre-
ates several challenges.
Firstly, the contracting authority needs to conduct
‘intelligence’ work to acquire the necessary informa-
tion. For example, the ESPD includes a new obliga-
tion derived from Article 59 to ensure that no per-
son serving on the economic operator’s administra-
tive, management and supervisory bodies, or with
powers of representation, decision or control there-
in, has been the subject of a conviction of crimes
such as corruption, fraud, terrorism, child labour,
etc.81The contracting authoritymust check the crim-
inal records of members of the successful bidder.
The process of verification is often resource-inten-
sive and may potentially introduce unequal treat-
ment among economic operators. The latter follows
from the fact that in some Member States there is
no criminal recordsdatabase (suchas theUK).There-
fore, the ESPD will need to suffice, while in other
Member States economic operators need to present
multiple excerpts of criminal records, while bearing
the increased costs of participation. If the criminal
records need to be checked for large framework
agreements then this will require resources of per-
sonnel and time. Contracting authorities must ob-
tain permission in writing from the economic oper-
ator to retrieve the records of relevant persons work-
ing for the latter. Due to issues of data protection and
privacy, such records cannot be copied or sent via
email. The contracting authority can only check the
records, but it cannot store them for a longer peri-
73 P Telles, ‘The European Single Procurement Document’ (2017) 4
Upphandlingsrättslig Tidskrift, 6.
74 Implementing Regulation (n 71); Article 71(5) 3 of Directive
2014/24/EU.
75 Article 59(1) of Directive 2014/24/EU.
76 There is no certainty what ‘without delay’ constitutes. The Direc-
tive is silent on how much time is needed to fulfil the discretion
of ‘without delay’ which may pose challenges in practice.
77 Article 59(4-8); Article 60 and where appropriate Article 62 of
Directive 2014/24/EU.
78 Article 59 Directive 2014/24/EU; see also GM Racca, ‘Electronic
Qualitative Selection of Economic Operators: the challenge of the
European Single Procurement Document (ESPD)’ in M Burgi, M
Trybus and S Treumer (eds), Qualification, Selection and Exclusion
in EU Procurement (Copenhagen: Djøf 2016), 303-325.
79 Article 59(5) of Directive 2014/24/EU.
80 Telles (n 72), 10.
81 Article 57 Directive 2014/24/EU.
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od. Consequently, the records must be either de-
stroyed or returned to the economic operator or a
special digital form of data sharing will have to be
introduced. According to a Finnish practitioner, the
complexity of the process is counter-productive, as
the bidders prefer a visit to the contracting authori-
ty to show the original records – tangibly – rather
than take advantage of the benefits of digitalisa-
tion.82
Another related issue regards the documents con-
tracting authorities ‘already possess’. If the contract-
ing authority is a small organisation there seems to
be no problem in identifying the correct file. How-
ever, if the contracting authority has many depart-
ments simultaneously conducting various procure-
ments, locating the documentsmaybe both challeng-
ing and time-consuming, unless a proper record
keeping system is in place. Not to mention that it
may be problematic to asses if the information in-
cluded in such documents is updated or if it is not
defective in some way, e.g. whether the names of the
company’s representatives on the submitted docu-
ments correspond with the current certificate of in-
corporation or whether all the licenses or certificates
are still valid.83
Secondly, the use of the ESPD introduces a risk of
non-compliance with the principle of equal treat-
ment in the context of two-stage procurement
processes. An economic operatormay be admitted to
the tender stage even if it does not meet the relevant
selection criteria as the ESPD shifts the stage of as-
sessing documentation from the beginning of the
procedure to the last stage of the procurement
process. In the worst case scenario, after a long pro-
curement process (i.e. competitive dialogue), a con-
tracting authoritymay find itself in a situationwhere
the successful bidder proves to be ineligible.84 This
may be due to the provision of false (fraudulent) or
inaccurate information, or failure to meet require-
ments the economicoperator only thought itmeets.85
This scenario is particularly risky as it may lead to a
waste of time and resources, potentially requiring
repetition of at least part of the procurement process.
Alternatively, the contracting authority may be
tempted to turn a blind eye to a lack of compliance
with selection criteria to escape the need of retender-
ing or terminating the procurement procedure.86
These risks seem to be acknowledged by the EU leg-
islator in Recital 84, where it is stated that in two-
stage procedures contracting authoritiesmay require
original documentation at the selection stage. Article
59(4) establishes that contracting authorities retain
the right of requesting the originals of the documents
at their discretion, which may be helpful in the con-
text of two-stage procedures.
Thirdly, the ESPD was expected to reduce the ad-
ministrative burden. The reason why the achieve-
ment of this objective is questionable is due to the
possible argument that the self-declaration intro-
duces a new layer of complexity for the contracting
authorities. TheESPDmakes itmoredifficult for con-
tracting authorities to apply relevant selection crite-
ria as it limits their discretion: they have to rely on a
'one-size-fits-all' ESPD form and try to fit all types of
procurement into it, without due regard to the fre-
quently arising necessity of more specific and elab-
orated documentation requirements.87 This ‘fitting
and adjusting’ exercisemay lead to delays in procure-
ment, due to the need for further clarifications.88
3. Favouring SMEs?
It is debatable if the ESPD rules can be classified as
favouringSMEs.Although theprovision contributes,
82 M Turunen, ‘Sometimes I feel like I am Sherlock’, blog post
available at <https://www.hansel.fi/blogi/2017/05/16/sometimes-i
-feel-i-am-sherlock/> Last accessed on 20 July 2017.
83 A Semple, A Practical Guide to Public Procurement (Oxford: OUP
2015), 103.
84 The failure of the economic operator to provide the necessary
documentation as evidence for the self-declarations made in the
ESPD constitute a discretionary ground for exclusion (Article 57
(4)(h)), which the contracting authority can apply any time (Arti-
cle 57(5)).
85 On serious misrepresentation when supplying information
requested by the contracting authority, see Case C-387/14 Esapro-
jekt [2017] ECLI-338.
86 In practice, there may be lack of incentive on the side of con-
tracting authorities, due to the used resources and cost. Similar
lack of incentive is present in cases of sustainable procurement
performance clauses. Even when they are not respected, con-
tracting authorities rarely if at all terminate the contract. View
presented by A Piening at the conference Procurement beyond
price: Sustainability and CSR in public purchasing, 4-5 May 2017
in Copenhagen referring to the real life example of handling a
SKI framework agreement clauses violation by Dell; See: Dan-
watch, Case study of labour conditions at 4 Dell suppliers in
China.
87 Semple (n 82), 103.
88 A Sánchez Graells and P Telles, ‘Commentary to the Regulation
59’ (2016) blog post on Public Contracts Regulations 2015,
available at <http://pcr2015.uk/regulations/regulation-59
-european-single-procurement-document/> Last accessed on 20
July 2017.
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to some extent, to the contracting authorities’ costs,
administrative burden, and the complexity of pro-
curement procedures, this is more than compensat-
ed for by the gains through increased competition.
Moreover, the ESDP is part of the broader reform to-
wards simplification and digitalisation of procure-
ment in general, and not solely for the promotion of
SMEs. Furthermore, the costs, administrative bur-
den, and complexity are possibly only a temporary
phenomenon, until contracting authorities learn
how to use the new tool and until harmonised, digi-
talised systems are in place. Finally, it could be ar-
gued that the negative impact of the ESPD on con-
tracting authorities stems from inappropriate prac-
tices rather than interpreting the rules as part of a
move towards favouring SMEs. Contracting author-
ities are likely to learn and adapt and in the process,
most of the costs, administrative burden, and com-
plexity will gradually be reduced.
V. The Minimum Turnover Requirement
(Cap)
Article 58 includes a list of possible requirements for
participation in procurement procedures. These con-
cern the suitability of the bidders to pursue the rele-
vant professional activity, their economic and finan-
cial standing, and their technical and professional
ability. Until recently, contracting authorities exer-
cised a ‘fair degree’ of discretion when establishing
turnover requirements.89The only limitations of that
discretion followed from the need to consider the
specifics of the particular contract, and to respect the
proportionality principle.90 Specifying particularly
onerous economic and financial standing criteria
may lead to diminished competition or block the ac-
cess of SMEs to procurement markets.91 Moreover,
financial requirements, especially the burdensome
minimal turnover, have been over-used by contract-
ing authorities in the past, thus hindering SME par-
ticipation in public procurement.92 SMEs’ size, lim-
ited financial resources and access to financing
makes bidding above certain turnover requirements
too risky or simply impossible. Recital 83 acknowl-
edges this effect by noting that:
overly demanding requirements concerning eco-
nomic and financial capacity frequently constitute
anunjustifiedobstacle to the involvementofSMEs
in public procurement. Any such requirements
should be related and proportionate to the subject-
matter of the contract.
1. The Cap
To address and mitigate this issue, Article 58 (3) in-
troduces a new cap limiting minimum turnover re-
quirements to a maximum of twice the contract val-
ue. The introduction of this provision is clearly in-
tended as amethod of promoting SMEsparticipation
in public procurement. It follows from the assess-
ment of the EUprocurement reformprocess. At first,
the Commission had proposed to introduce a higher
turnover cap of three times the contract value.93
Then, based on the report from the Committee on
the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IM-
CO) the provision on turnover was reduced to the
current level.94 Based on an assessment of the con-
tract awardnotices for above the thresholds contracts
published on TED in 2012, reducing the turnover cri-
teria from thrice to twice the contract value appears
to open a sizeable newmarket tranche (improvement
of 8% participation) for ‘typical’ micro-enterprises.95
Considering that SME organisations such as
UEAPME had demanded for a turnover requirement
cap of five times the contract value, 96 the final ver-
89 See joined Cases C-27-29/86 CEI & Bellini, judgment of 9 July
1987, ECR I-3347, [26-28]; Case 31/87 Beentjes [1988] ECR
I-4635, [17]; Case C-315/01 Gesellschaft für Abfallentsorgungs-
Technik GmbH (GAT) and Österreichische Autobahnen und
Schnellstraßen AG (ÖSAG) [2003] ECR I-6351, [61]. 
90 Article 18 of Directive 2014/24/EU.
91 Turnover requirements have been already identified as ‘formida-
ble obstacles’ to access procurement market by SME[s] in Propos-
al for Procurement Directive, COM(2011) 896 final, at 11.
92 See French judgement of the Conseil d’Etat CE of 9 July 2007,
Syndicat EGF-BTP, no297711; CE 29 Nov. 2006, Agence na-
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sion of Directive 2014/24/EU by far exceeded SMEs
expectations.
2. Sufficiently Protecting Contracting
Authorities?
The new minimum turnover limitation raises the
question of whether it favours SMEs by neglecting
the valid interests and concerns of contracting au-
thorities. Contracting authorities and, consequently,
public procurement processes need to be protected
frompossible illiquidity and financial distress of eco-
nomic operators. In other words, by requiring too
small a minimum turnover, contracting authorities
expose themselves to a higher risk of procurement
failure thus compromising the primary objective of
procuring what they need to operate under the best
possible terms. This can be particularly important if
Article 58 (3) is interpreted as limiting theminimum
turnover to twice the annual value of the contract,
rather than its total value.97 The rationale for such
interpretationwould be that inmany contracts SMEs
would be unable to participate if the contracting au-
thorities required the minimum of double the total
value of the contract. Thus, favouring SMEs would
suggest interpreting the rules as referring to annual
value. However, this would be improper, as in cases
of long-term public contracts requiring large invest-
ments SMEs with a sole double annual turnover will
be most presumably unable to carry out the neces-
sary investment and thus pose a risk to the execution
of the entire procurement contract. Consequently,
the Article 58 (3) should be interpreted as referring
to the total value of the contract rather than the an-
nual value.
To alleviate the potential risk comingwith the new
cap, Article 58 (3) enables contracting authorities to
increase the requirement beyond the existing limita-
tion in ‘duly justified cases’. This refers to cases “such
as relating to the special risks attached to the nature
of the works, services or supplies”. The wording of
the provision is not very clear – the only certain as-
pect is that the exception shall be interpretednarrow-
ly to avoid abuses of discretion. This argument is sup-
ported by the fact that contracting authorities “shall
indicate the main reasons for such a requirement in
the procurement documents or the individual report
referred to inArticle 84.” In otherwords, if a contract-
ing authority wishes to apply more burdensome re-
quirements regarding the yearly turnover of the eco-
nomic operator, it needs to document its decision as
well as reasons for taking it.
Furthermore, the turnover limitation shall be at-
tuned in situations where the contract is divided in-
to lots. In such cases, the contracting authorities
shall apply [the rule] in relation to each individual
lot. However, contracting authorities may set the
minimum yearly turnover that economic opera-
tors are required to have by reference to groups of
lots in the event that the successful tenderer is
awarded several lots to be executed at the same
time.98
If the contract is to be awarded on the basis of frame-
work agreements or dynamic purchasing systems,
the limiting turnover cap should be calculated on the
basis of the expected maximum size of specific con-
tracts. In cases of contracts divided into many low-
value lots or awarded under a framework agreement
with many economic operators, the cap limitation of
twice the contract value may still be too high. There-
fore, it is important to read the rules of Article 58 (3)
in conjunction with Article 58 (1), so that established
limitations are “strictly proportionate to the subject-
matter of the contract”. That may lead to the conclu-
sion that in particular cases setting a minimum
turnover at twice the contract value may be dispro-
portionate and it should be lower.
3. Favouring SMEs?
While larger companies also benefit from a lower
minimum turnover requirement, they can normally
meet higher requirements, so that the new cap clear-
ly promotes SMEparticipation. However, it is argued
that minimum turnover requirements cannot be cat-
egorised as a provision that favours SMEs. This is be-
cause, firstly, even though Directive 2014/24/EU in-
troduces higher risks for contracting authorities by
setting a relatively low turnover cap, it provides con-
tracting authoritieswith a ‘protective shield’ through
the exception provision in ‘duly justified cases’. Se-
condly, contracting authorities have other tools to
mitigate the risk at their disposal, including a track
97 Arrowsmith (n 32), 1192-1195.
98 Article 58(3) of Directive 2014/24/EU.
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record of previous successfully rendered services or
previous economic indicators, such as ratios between
assets and liabilities. A positive ratio showing high-
er levels of assets than of liabilities could provide ad-
ditional evidence that the financial capacity of eco-
nomic operators is sufficient.99 Thirdly, a certain lev-
el of protection is still provided by this minimum
turnover requirement. Finally, it is argued that the
higher risk of contracting authorities is compensat-
ed by the fruits of increased competition.
VI. Direct Payments to Subcontractors
There are many SMEs which are perfectly capable to
act as prime contractors and have been awarded and
successfully performed public works, supplies, and
services contracts. However, due to their limited size
as well as technical and financial capacity many
SMEs will be subcontractors in, at times, very long
supply chains of large companies acting as prime
contractors. There is a close connection between pro-
curement rules promoting SME participation and
procurement rules regulating subcontracting and the
supply chain. Article 25 of the old Directive
2004/18/EC was very short on this matter by only re-
quiring:
In the contract documents, the contracting author-
itymay ask ormay be required by aMember State
to ask the tenderer to indicate in his tender any
share of the contract hemay intend to subcontract
to third parties and any proposed subcontractors.
This information requirement was only comple-
mentedbya reference toprimecontractor liability.100
1. Bypassing the Prime Contractor
However, Article 71(3) Directive 2014/24/EU was al-
so introduced:
Member States may provide that at the request of
the subcontractor andwhere the nature of the con-
tract so allows, the contracting authority shall
transfer due payments directly to the subcontrac-
tor for services, supplies or works provided to the
economic operator to whom the public contract
has been awarded (the main contractor). Such
measures may include appropriate mechanisms
permitting the main contractor to object to undue
payments. The arrangements concerning that
mode of payment shall be set out in the procure-
ment documents.101
Thus, Member States can provide in their transpos-
ing laws that subcontractors are paid directly by the
contracting authority rather than having to wait for
payments from the prime contractor. This offers sub-
contractors, which are often SMEs, an efficient way
of protecting their interest in being paid. However,
not all subcontractors are SMEs and therefore this
provision might equally benefit large companies
when acting as subcontractors. Nevertheless, inter
alia the Explanatory Memorandum to the 2011 Draft
leading to the 2014 Directive clearly identifies this as
one of four main measures to promote SME partici-
pation in public procurement.102
The July 2013 Draft and 2014 final text changed
the wording of the 2011 Draft slightly as procedures
permitting prime contractors to object to undue pay-
mentsnowonlymaybe included,whereas in the 2011
Draft they had to be put in place. According to Arti-
cle 71(7) of Directive 2014/24/EUMember Statesmay
“go further under national law on direct payments to
subcontractors”; this can include a requirement for
direct payments to subcontractorswithout themhav-
ing to request them. Moreover, according to Article
71(8) Member States having chosen to provide for
measures pursuant to inter alia Article 71(3) must
specify the implementing conditions for those mea-
sures. Member States may limit the applicability of
these implementing measures, “for instance in re-
spect of certain types of contracts, certain categories
of contacting authorities or economic operators or as
of certain amounts.” However, the general direct pay-
ment rule in Article 71(3), the possibility to go fur-
ther in Article 71(7) on the one hand, and the possi-
bility to limit the applicability of the rule on the oth-
er hand are options – Member States do not even
have to implement the direct payment regime of the
Directive at all, they can limit it and/or extend it. Reg-
ulation 113(3) UK Public Contract Regulations 2015,
for example, while requiring quick payments down
99 Recital 83 of Directive 2014/24/EU.
100 Article 25(2) of Directive 2004/18/EC reads: “This indication shall
be without prejudice to the question of the principal economic
operator's liability.”
101 Emphasis added.
102 Proposal for Procurement Directive (n 90).
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the supply chain, does not implement the direct pay-
ment regime of the Directive.Moreover, according to
Article 71(3) of Directive 2014/24/EU, direct pay-
ments should only be provided “where the nature of
the contract so allows.” It appears that this is subject
to the judgment of the contracting authority and the
impact of this reservationwill dependon factors such
as the extent to which this discretion is regulated or
generally the criteria that should guide this assess-
ment. There is no guidance for this assessment pro-
vided inDirective 2014/24/EU.Moreover, thiswill de-
pend onwhether the judgment of the contracting au-
thority can be challenged, especially in review pro-
ceedings.
The direct payment rule had been the only inno-
vation to the subcontracting regime in the 2011 Draft
Proposal. In the July 2013 Draft and the final 2014 Di-
rective, Article 71 was significantly extended. How-
ever, it needs to be emphasised that the remainder
of this subcontracting regime of the newDirective in
its Article 71 (1)-(2), (4)-(6) and most of (8) of Direc-
tive 2014/24/EUdoes not promote the access of SMEs
to public contracts as such. These paragraphs regu-
late issues such as ensuring that the social and envi-
ronmental requirements applicable toprimecontrac-
tors are also fulfilled by subcontractors, information
requirements for prime contractors on their subcon-
tractors, liability rules, and the qualification and ex-
clusion of subcontractors. Therefore, the SME friend-
ly direct payment rule is simply part of a more de-
tailed subcontracting regime in the new Directive.
Only the optional information requirement on sub-
contractors in Article 71(2) and the related liability
rule in Article 71(4) of Directive 2014/24/EU had al-
ready been contained in Article 25 of Directive
2004/18/EC.103
2. Favouring SMEs?
It is submitted that the direct payments to subcon-
tractors do not favour SMEs adding to the costs or
administrative burden or complexity to be shoul-
dered by contracting authorities. During the consul-
tation process, a majority of public authorities and
civil society organisations favoured allowing public
procurers to have more influence on subcontracting
by the successful tenderer, while the other stakehold-
er groups rejected such a possibility.104 “Other stake-
holders” will mainly refer to prime contractors and
their opposition is understandable since a more de-
tailed regulation of their subcontracting interferes
with their freedom of contract. This opposition of
prime contractors might imply a possible negative
effect of the direct payments rule on competition as
it might deter prime contractors. This could be inter-
preted as a cost for contracting authorities. Howev-
er, there is no evidence for such an effect and this
was not indicated in the Green Paper either.
The direct payment rule would also only add little
to the complexity of the procurement process bur-
dening contracting authorities. They would have to
have a clear idea of the subcontractors and initiate
payments but this complexity would arguably be too
limited to be characterised as a rule that is favouring
SMEs.
VII. Conclusions
This article argued that none of the four innovations
of Directive 2014/24/EU introduced to facilitate the
participation of SMEs in public procurement can be
classified as regimes favouring SMEs, to promote the
participation of these economic operators to an ex-
tent that the primary objectives of efficient procure-
ment, value formoney, non-discrimination, and com-
petition are significantly compromised. The division
into lots will make procurement more complex for
103 With regards to the promotion of SMEs through their access to
public contracts by regulating subcontracting, the regime of
Article 71 of Directive 2014/24/EU cannot be compared to that of
Article 21 and Title III of the Defence and Security Procurement
Directive 2009/81/EC, the latest procurement instrument before
the 2014 reform. Directive 2009/81/EC contains four different
options for subcontracting, including options involving the award
of subcontracts through a notice in the OJ. Lord Young suggested
a similar approach for the UK, but on a voluntary basis. The Lord
Young report (n 18) reads: “Nine big public procurement suppli-
ers have agreed to, where appropriate, advertise their subcon-
tracting opportunities on Contracts Finder. SMEs should expect
more to follow” (p. 43). However, the subcontracting regime in
Directive 2009/81/EC is intended as a substitute for the now
almost banned defence-specific practice of offsets (see M Trybus,
Buying Defence and Security in Europe: The EU Defence and
Security Procurement Directive in Context (Cambridge: CUP
2014), Chapter 9), a context not applicable to ‘civil’ public
sector procurement. Moreover, the extensive subcontracting
regime of the Defence and Security Directive 2009/81/EC might
be of limited benefit in the context of Directives 2014/24/EU and
2014/25/EU and even Directive 2009/81/EC itself, an issue that
cannot be explored further in this article. Nevertheless, the
extensive subcontracting regime of Directive 2009/81/EC shows
how far the EU legislator is prepared to go. In comparison, they
did not go very far in the Directive 2014/24/EU.
104 Green Paper (n 66), 13: According to a figure (p. 5) 39% of
stakeholders wanted more control of subcontracting and this is
also mentioned under “other issues” (p. 18).
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contracting authorities and cause them some costs,
the ESDP will cause some costs and teething prob-
lems, the turnover requirement increases risk for con-
tracting authorities, and the direct payment rule, if
transposed,might irritate prime contractors. Howev-
er, subject to transposition and actual practice, the
costs and complications are limited and will be re-
duced over time and the potential increase in com-
petition might well enhance value for money. There-
fore, the fourmeasures donot compromise theprime
objectives of procurement but serve them to an ex-
tent. The promotion of SMEs as a sustainable goal is
an added value of the 2014 reform – facilitating a sec-
ondary objective without compromising the prima-
ry objectives. Whether any of the four innovations
are likely to actually meet their objective of increas-
ing SME participation in public procurement is a dif-
ferent question for a different article.
